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The Impact of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Choice of 
Adaptation Strategies: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia 
Hailu Elias, Mintewab Bezabih Ayele, and Tadele Ferede 
Abstract 
Climate adaptation actions, like any other investment, require financial resources, which are 
likely to be in short supply in the rural sector in developing countries. This paper assesses the role of 
credit constraints in the choice of adaptation strategies in settings with severe financial market 
imperfections. Household-level panel data from selected zones in the highland region of Ethiopia, 
combined with climate information from the adjacent meteorological stations, is employed in the 
analysis. We quantify the linkage between different forms of credit constraints and choice of climate 
adaptation strategies, using a multivariate probit regression model. Credit constrained households are 
significantly less likely to adopt crop diversification and off-farm employment strategies. While credit 
access encourages irrigation, soil conservation and tree planting are the least responsive to credit access. 
These results indicate that the severity of credit constraints depends on both the nature of the credit 
constraint and the type of adaptation investment. 
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The Impact of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on 
Choice of Adaptation Strategies: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia 
Hailu Elias, Mintewab Bezabih Ayele, and Tadele Ferede∗ 
1. Introduction 
Agrarian economies in low-income developing countries, characterized by an 
uncertain production environment, are inherently risk-prone (Dercon 2002; Yesuf and 
Bluffstone 2009). The riskiness of the sector is likely to be exacerbated by the threats of 
climate change (IPCC 2014; Kurukulasuriya et al. 2006). Identifying the opportunities 
and constraints associated with effective adaptation strategies is, thus, critical for the 
performance of the sector and the economy as a whole (Madison 2007; Bryan et al. 
2013). 
Most of the traditional risk sharing or mitigating strategies, particularly those 
associated with a wider range of shocks, provide only a partial insurance mechanism 
(Mogues 2011), have a high opportunity cost, tend to be very localized, and are limited in 
scope (Dercon 2009). In such settings, credit access tends to act as insurance against 
income shocks (e.g., Yang and Choi 2007).1 This implies that credit access can 
potentially be a key strategy to expand and strengthen risk mitigation instruments, 
particularly with the increasing threat of climate change. In this paper, we assess how 
different levels of credit constraints affect participation in climate-adaptive 
investments/instruments, using panel data from rural Ethiopia. 
The literature on the relationship between credit access and shocks attests to the 
view that financial resources can help the poor harness capabilities needed to be resilient 
against shocks (Ellis 2000). However, the direct role of access to credit in withstanding 
climatic shocks and the nature of credit constraints and their differing impacts on specific 
climate change adaptation strategies is not fully understood. 
An in-depth analysis of the role of credit constraints in adaptation in the context 
of climate change is pertinent for the following reasons. There is a growing literature on 
the links between climate change and agricultural performance, as well as the impacts of 
                                                 
∗ Mintewab Bezabih Ayele, London School of Economics, corresponding author: 
mintewab.bezabih@port.ac.uk. Hailu Elias and Tadele Ferede, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. 
1 Other  financial resources that serve similar purposes include remittances and savings (e.g., Fafchamps et 
al. 1998) and Jacoby and Skofias 1997). However, the analysis in this paper focuses on credit access.  
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alternative climate adaptation strategies on productivity in the African context (for 
example, see Di Falco and Bulte 2011; Di Falco et al. 2011; Di Falco and Veronsi 2014; 
Adger et al. 2003; Seo and Mendelsohn 2008; Hassan and Nhemachena 2008). In 
addition, the literature on the determinants of adaptation strategies is also a growing area 
of research (e.g., Teklewold et al. 2015; Di Falco and Veronsi 2014; Deressa et al. 2009). 
However, there has been little exploration of the impact of credit constraints on the 
choice of adaption strategies.2 Specifically, the choice of adaptation strategies and their 
likely differing responsiveness to financial constraints has been significantly under-
researched, especially within a panel framework. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a discussion on climate 
change, credit constraints and adaptive capacity of farm households is presented. Section 
3 discusses climate change and credit access in the context of Ethiopia. The survey 
strategy and data description are provided in Section 4, while the methodological 
approach, consisting of the econometric strategy, is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
presents the empirical findings and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Key Strategies in Adaptation to Climate Change and the Role of Credit 
Constraints: A Literature Review 
In this section, we review the key climate adaptation tools identified in previous 
literature, focusing on those that are relevant in the empirical context in this study. We 
also assess how each tool is potentially linked to credit constraints. We choose credit as a 
determinant of adaptation strategy because investment decisions and agricultural 
productivity are greatly impacted by credit market imperfections, as shown conceptually 
(e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) and empirically (Guirkinger and Boucher 2008; Ali et al. 
2012). However, the specific role of credit constraints with respect to climate adaptation 
has not been widely explored.3 
                                                 
2 Section 2 presents a detailed review of the literature on the links between credit access and adaptation to 
climate change, focusing on the responsiveness of key adaptation strategies (that are relevant to the setting 
of the study and empirical analysis) to credit constraints, and highlighting the gaps in the exisiting literature.   
3 As many adaptation strategies could be considered as investment/disinvestment strategies, the key role of 
credit in shaping agricultural investment decisions is what makes it a pivotal potential instrument in the 
choice of adaptation strategies. However, credit/borrowing from formal and informal sources is in some 
instances seen as a coping strategy by itself (Feder et al. 1985). 
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The choice of the adaptation strategies for this study is based on Deressa et al. 
(2009) and Di Falco et al. (2011), who assessed responses of farmers who were asked 
what measures they have taken in response to perceived changes in temperature and 
precipitation. Accordingly, we consider the following key strategies as climate adaptation 
tools: soil conservation and tree planting, off-farm employment, crop diversification, 
asset depletion, and irrigation.4 
The first strategy, the adoption of soil conservation technologies, has long been 
understood as a pivotal tool for enhancing food security for smallholder farmers in Sub-
Saharan Africa and increasingly more so as a way of shielding against climate risk (Di 
Falco and Veronsi 2014; Teklewold et al. 2015). Particular to developing countries, the 
adoption of soil and water conservation measures is found to be one of the major 
responses to perceived long-term changes in temperature and rainfall (Deressa et al. 
2009; Di Falco and Bulte 2011; Kato et al. 2009). 
Notwithstanding their importance in both food security and climate risk 
mitigation (Kassie et al. 2013), the adoption of soil conservation technologies remains too 
low (Holden et al. 1998; Holden and Shiferaw 2001). Among the many factors that act as 
barriers to investment in soil conservation, credit market imperfections (which result in 
short-term planning horizons) are argued to be strong contributors to making investment 
in soil conservation unattractive (Holden et al. 1998). 
The second strategy is crop diversification and the adoption of seed technology. 
The strategy has significant potential to help farmers withstand the effects of varying 
climatic factors by increasing overall productivity of agricultural systems. In addition, 
diversification reduces the risk of crop loss associated with climatic variability (through 
spreading out the growing and harvesting of different crops over the course of the year) 
(Di Falco et al. 2010; Di Falco and Chavas 2009). In some cases, particular seed 
technologies are also shown to play an effective role in buffering against rainfall 
variability (e.g., Bezu et al. 2014). 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that asset depletion was also reported as a risk mitigation strategy in the survey that we 
use in the analysis, but not in the two studies discussed above. We included asset depletion as one of the 
adaptation strategies. The strategies that we have identified below as adaptation strategies could be 
understood to be risk mitigation strategies. Further, these adaptation strategies could also be thought of as 
ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies, with crop diversification, soil conservation and 
participation in off-farm employment falling into the first category and asset depletion falling into the 
second category. 
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While diversification could be considered a capital-saving strategy, certain crop 
varieties could require access to capital. In their study of the responsiveness of household 
crop patterns to changing prices and credit availability, Komarek (2010) finds that 
significant changes in household cropping patterns could occur with improved access to 
credit. Similarly, Cavatassi et al. (2012) show the negative impact of credit constraints on 
the ability to diversify. Credit access also has the tendency to increase farm-level 
diversity by increasing access to different seed materials; in a resource-poor system, even 
modern varieties appear to contribute to rather than threaten diversity (Benin et al. 2003). 
The third strategy considered in this study, off-farm employment, is also known to 
act as a buffer against climate change (Deressa et al. 2009; Di Falco et al. 2011; Davies et 
al. 2013; Eakin 2005). However, off-farm income tends to be more effective as a climate 
coping strategy because climate shocks are idiosyncratic rather than covariant due to the 
possible correlation with climate-dependent agricultural incomes (Bank 2005). 
Participation in off-farm activities tends to be constrained by capital needs, as credit 
constraints may prevent households from taking up non-agricultural activities (Mcnamara 
and Weiss 2005; Ito and Kurosaki 2009).  
The fourth adaptation strategy considered in this paper is irrigation. The reduction 
in water availability as a result of climate change (both in terms of quantity and 
reliability) increases the need for an efficient water management system for agriculture, 
such as irrigation, particularly in Africa (Vörösmarty et al. 2010). The responsiveness of 
irrigated and rainfed farms to climatic factors is shown to be significantly different in 
Africa (e.g., Deressa et al. 2006), South America (Seo and Mendelsohn 2008), and the 
U.S. (Wanga et al. 2009). It should be noted, however, that irrigation’s ability to mitigate 
water scarcity is limited globally by the overall reduction in water availability (Eliotta et 
al. 2014). 
As with the other strategies, there is evidence of significant links between credit 
constraints and irrigation. Using data on irrigation wells in India, Fafchamps and Pender 
(1996) show that the availability of credit can dramatically increase investment in 
irrigation and that interest-rate subsidization has little impact. In Colombia, credit 
policies promote private investment in irrigation (Dinar and Keck 1997). However, in 
their assessment of the determinants of irrigation adoption in the Tigray region of 
Ethiopia, Gebregziabher et al. (2009) find that access to extension service, as opposed to 
credit, has a significant impact. 
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Overall, the literature indicates the relevance of the strategies discussed above as 
climate adaptation tools. However, the degrees of adaptation effectiveness could be 
dependent on the adaptation options available to a given set of households, which calls 
for analysing the joint responsiveness of adaptation strategies to climatic factors. In 
addition, the stringency of credit constraints could differ depending on the credit 
demands of a given adaptation strategy. These observations indicate the need to 
empirically investigate the relationships between the adaptation strategies and credit 
constraints. 
3. Climate Change and Credit Constraints in the Ethiopian Context 
Climate models estimate that the median temperature in Africa will increase 
between 3 and 4oC by the end of the 21st century, which is roughly 1.5 times higher than 
the global mean response (Bryan et al. 2013). This makes poor African countries such as 
Ethiopia more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, particularly given 
their limited adaptive capacity. In line with this, estimates by FAO (2008) indicate that, 
by 2100, climate change alone would cause a decline in GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa by 
about 2 to 7 percent. 
Particular to Ethiopia, global circulation models predict an increase in mean 
temperature of 0.9 to 1.1oC by 2030, 1.7 to 2.1oC by 2050 and 2.7 to 3.4 oC by 2080 
(Belliethathan et al. 2009). Further, Tadege (2007) showed that long-term climate change 
in Ethiopia is associated with changes in precipitation patterns, rainfall variability, and 
temperature, which could increase the country’s frequency of droughts and floods. 
Indeed, Ethiopia is highly susceptible to frequent climate extremes such as disastrous 
droughts and floods, which have caused significant adverse effects on the country’s 
economy and society and are expected to become more pronounced in the future under 
climate change (You and Ringler 2010).  
Rainfall variability has particularly contributed to many of the food shortages and 
crop crises farmers constantly face (Birhanu and Zeller 2011; Di Falco et al. 2010). 
Dercon (2009) also showed that about half of all rural households in Ethiopia 
experienced at least one major drought in the five years preceding 2004, suggesting that 
climatic shocks are a major cause of transient poverty and welfare loss. For instance, 
between 1900 and 2009, Ethiopia experienced 12 extreme droughts, which killed over 
402,000 people, adversely affected the livelihoods of more than 54 million people, and 
caused damage of about US $93 million. Similarly, 47 major floods occurred in Ethiopia 
during the same period, killing 1,957 and affecting 2.2 million Ethiopians, while 
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damaging approximately US$ 16.5 million worth of property (EM-DAT 2009). 
According to a report of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED 
2008), climatic and health shocks remain the most common types of shocks to affect 
Ethiopian farm households. 
Studies on poverty and vulnerability in Africa have also identified Ethiopia as one 
of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, and one of those with the least 
adaptive capacity (Orindi et al. 2006; Stige et al. 2006). This is understandable for two 
reasons. The first is Ethiopia’s huge dependence on agriculture. Subsistence agriculture 
remains the primary source of income for more than 80 percent of Ethiopians and 
accounts for about 44 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. The 
sector is dominated by smallholder farmers, who produce more than 90 percent of crop 
output and cultivate more than 95 percent of the crop land (MoFED 2014). Second, the 
sector depends largely on rainfall, which has become increasingly erratic due to climate 
change.   
In terms of socio-economic conditions, families engaged in subsistence 
agriculture with higher dependency ratios are found to be highly vulnerable to climatic 
shocks (World Bank 2005). Changes in the mean rainfall and temperature, as well as the 
increase in extreme events, affect agriculture, livestock, forestry and fisheries. Small-
scale, rain-fed farming and pastoralist systems, inland and coastal fishing and aquaculture 
communities, and forest-based systems are particularly vulnerable to climate change, 
with vulnerability varying across communities, dependent on factors including resource 
ownership, gender, age and health (FAO 2008). 
Adaptation, in relation to climate change, is an adjustment in natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected shock factors or their effects, in order to 
moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. Adaptive capacity, on the other hand, 
is the ability of a system or society to modify its characteristics or behavior so as to cope 
better with changes brought about by external conditions such as climate change (IPCC 
2014). Improving the adaptive capacity of farmers can significantly reduce their 
vulnerability to climate change (Mendelshon 1998). 
Availability and accessibility of a reliable and well-functioning credit market is 
expected to improve adaptive capacity of farm households. As the life-cycle hypothesis 
suggests (Friedman 1957), existence of a perfect and complete credit market allows 
households to borrow the amount of credit they want when they face liquidity problems 
and repay it in a period of high income. However, in low-income countries, access to 
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credit is limited due to imperfections in the credit market; hence, credit constraints are 
binding. This may force households to resort to adopting inefficient adaptation strategies 
that have long-term negative consequences for their future welfare. Crop failure due to 
rainfall variability, for example, can force farmers to sell their assets to smooth out 
consumption. In some cases, the value of assets can also drop if shocks persist for a 
relatively longer period. This implies that climatic shocks, coupled with binding credit 
constraints, may lead to irreversible loss of productive assets and may put households at 
risk of future poverty. 
In the context of Ethiopia, there are reasons to expect that the adaptive capacity of 
farm households is limited due to binding credit constraints (EEA 2011). The lion’s share 
of bank loans in Ethiopia go to finance public enterprises and sectors given priority by 
the government (IMF 2012: 12). Additionally, Ethiopia ranks 104th out of 185 countries 
in terms of access to credit (World Bank 2013). Banks in Ethiopia are not willing to lend 
to smallholder farmers due to the inherent risk of agricultural production and lack of 
collateral; hence, smallholder farmers are automatically excluded from the formal 
banking market. Micro-financing institutions and rural credit cooperatives provide 
alternative formal credit to farm households. However, despite the rapid growth of these 
institutions in recent years, they reach less than 20 percent of farm households and less 
than 3 percent of the rural and urban population (AEMFI 2011). 
4. The Study Area, Data Set, and Variables
Data used in this study was collected from the Amhara region using two waves of 
rural household surveys conducted in 2011and 2013.The Amhara National Regional State 
(ANRS) is situated between 9°–13°45’N latitude and 36°–40°30’E longitude in the north-
western part of Ethiopia, with a total land area of 157,126.85 km (which is about 15 
percent of the country’s land area) and with an altitude ranging from 600 meters above 
sea level (asl) in the Metema area to 4520 meters asl at Ras Dashen Mountain. The 
regional economy is highly dependent on agricultural production, which is mainly a 
smallholder’s production system, with the majority practicing traditional methods of 
farming. Agriculture is the backbone of the regional economy, with a total cultivated area 
of 4.40 million hectares (33.92 percent of the cultivated area of the country) and total 
production of 75.68 million quintals (31.89 percent of the country’s production). Cereals, 
pulses, oil seeds, fibers, cotton and root crops are the major crops grown in the region. 
The region also has a huge potential in terms of livestock population, as it comprises 
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about 25.15 per cent of the Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) of the country (MoFED 
2014). 
The survey sites include households from four zones (North Shewa, South Wollo, 
North Wollo and West Gojjam) of the Amhara National Regional State, located in the 
Northern and Central Highlands of Ethiopia (Figure 1). The surveys were carried out by 
the Ethiopian Economics Association, in collaboration with the University of California, 
University of Athens, FAO, and the European Commission Joint Research Center. 
Figure 1. Location Map of the Study Area, Ethiopia 
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Sample households were interviewed on issues related to crop and livestock 
production, marketing, farm and non-farm income, household consumption expenditure, 
ownership of assets, participation in non-agricultural enterprises, exposure to drought 
shocks and credit access. Out of a total of 1200 households, the analysis in this paper is 
based on balanced panel data for 1,189 households in the years 2011 and 2013. About 33 
percent of the sampled households reside in North Shewa zone, 31 percent in West 
Gojjam, 23 percent in South Wollo, and the remaining 13 percent in North Wollo (Table 
1). 
Table 1. Sample Households by Zone (2011 and 2013)5 
Zone Percent 
North Shewa 33.22 
West Gojjam 31.12 
South Wollo 23.13 
North Wollo 12.53 
Total 100 
 Source: Computed from EPIICA's 2011 and 2013 survey data. 
4.1. Dependent Variable: Choice of Different Adaptation Strategies 
Our analysis considers a number of adaptation strategies, including crop 
diversification, irrigation, investment in soil conservation and tree planting activities, 
participation in off-farm employment activities, and drawing down on household 
productive assets (asset depletion). The soil conservation and tree planting variable is a 
dummy variable representing the presence of a soil conservation structure or tree(s) on 
the farmstead.  Similarly, participation in off-farm activities is defined as a dummy 
variable that includes activities such as trading agricultural products, wholesale/retail 
trade/shop and being employed in non-farm activities for a certain wage. We define farm-
level diversification in two ways: count diversity and cash vs. staple crop. Count diversity 
is defined as the number of crops grown by the household. The second diversification 
variable is defined as a dummy variable, with one representing a cash crop and zero 
otherwise. The irrigation and depletion of assets are also dummy variables. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the adaptation strategies in the year 2013. 
Approximately 53 percent of the sampled households opted for crop diversification, 
5North Shewa is the reference zone in the empirical analysis. 
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while 33 percent invested in soil conservation activities, including tree planting. Investing 
in off-farm income generating activities, dis-saving, and depleting productive assets were 
the other adaptation strategies used by about 12 percent, 27 percent and 25 percent of the 
sample households, respectively, in 2013 (Figure 2). 
Table 2. Choice of Adaptation Strategies by Households in the Sample 
Type of Strategy 
2011 
(percent) 
2013 
(percent) 
Soil conservation and tree planting 24.91 33.14 
Irrigating the farm land  5.6 13.37 
Crop diversification 26.73 53.41 
Selling (depleting) productive assets 41.72 25.23 
Using cash savings or dis-saving 26.58 26.75 
Participation in a safety net program 13.2 11.44 
Receive assistance from the government or NGO  12.28 12.03 
Participation in off-farm self-employment activities 10.6 11.94 
Source: Computed from EPIICA's survey data. 
Figure 2. Household Choice of Adaptation Strategies (2013) 
Source: Own figure based on EPIICA's 2011 and 2013 survey. 
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4.2. Explanatory Variables 
We categorized variables explaining farmer's choice of adaptation strategies into 
measures of climate variability; indicators of credit constraint status; household 
demographic characteristics; ownership of physical assets; and social capital. Table 3 
presents the descriptive statistics of these variables. 
4.2.1. Credit Constrained Categories 
Identifying constrained households is an empirical challenge because credit 
rationing cannot be observed directly. However, two identification strategies are 
documented in the literature (Guirkinger and Boucher 2008; Ayalew and Deininger 
2014): the direct and indirect approaches. In this paper, we used the direct elicitation 
strategy and identified five credit constraint categories. The unconstrained category 
includes unconstrained borrowers and unconstrained non-borrowers. The unconstrained 
borrowers are those who have identified themselves as having full access to credit 
facilities from lending institutions.6 The unconstrained non-borrowers are those who have 
stated that they do not borrow from credit institutions because they do not have an urgent 
need for external finance or they do not have a profitable project that would require a 
loan. The premise here is that the resource allocation decisions of such households are 
not affected by the prevailing credit market imperfections. 
6 The credit limit set by lenders to overcome the information asymmetry problem will not be binding for 
such borrowers. 
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Table 3. Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Data Analysis 
Variable Description mean Std. dev. 
Dependent variables: Choice of 5 different Adaptation strategies 
Soil_conserv Soil conservation (1= yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.41 0.49 
Crop_divers crop diversification (1= yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.21 0.41 
Off_farm off-farm employment (1= yes; 0 = otherwise ) 0.12 0.32 
irrigation Irrigation (1= yes; 0 = otherwise) 0.13 0.34 
Dis_sav Asset depletion (1= yes; 0 = otherwise 0.3 0.46 
Explanatory variables 
Household characteristics 
age age of the HH head (years) 49.72 14.12 
female 1 = household head is female 0.11 0.31 
marr 1 = head is married 0.87 0.34 
hh_size 
household size (number of members of the 
HH) 5.4 2.05 
no_educ 1 = head is uneducated 0.53 0.5 
infrml_educ 1 = head attended some informal education 0.26 0.44 
frml_educ 1 = head attended some formal education 0.21 0.41 
Resource constraints 
lnd_hect Farm size, ha 0.9 0.7 
TLU 
Livestock herd size (Tropical Livestock units; 
TLU) 9.1 9.89 
Asset_value total value of household asset, Birr* 1175.92 2261.27 
own_radio 1 = head owns radio 0.25 0.43 
Climatic shocks 
rain_cv Coeff. of variation (CV) of rainfall 0.36 0.11 
Mean_rainfall Annual mean rainfall 104.9 18.3 
Mean_temp Annual mean temperature 32.07 2.8 
drought 
1 = Household faced drought shock (self-
reported) 0.39 0.49 
Credit constraint status 
IMR1 
Inverse mill's ratio for unconstrained 
borrowers (from first stage reg) 0.43 0.34 
IMR2 
Inverse mill's ratio for unconstrained non 
borrowers (from first stage reg) 0.35 0.28 
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IMR3 
Inverse mill's ratio for quantity constrained 
borrowers (from first stage reg) 0.45 0.34 
IMR4 
Inverse mill's ratio for discouraged borrowers 
(from first stage reg) 0.49 0.37 
IMR5 
Inverse mill's ratio for risk rationed borrowers 
(from first stage reg) 0.44 0.34 
prvs_cnst 
1 = HH faced credit constraint in the previous 
period (used as IV in the first stage reg.) 0.16 0.37 
Social capital (networks) 
Solidarity_group 
1 = head is member in a solidarity group (used 
as IV in the first stage reg.) 0.23 0.42 
cp_mem 
1 = head is member in a primary farmer's 
coop. 0.92 0.26 
Kebele_asso 1 = head is member of peasant association 0.098 0.28 
Ekub_mem 1 = head is member in Ekub (ROSCA) 0.23 0.42 
Location dummies 
nshoa 1 = North Shewa zone 0.34 0.47 
wgoj 1 = West Gojjam zone 0.31 0.46 
swolo 1 = South Wollo zone 0.23 0.42 
nwolo 1 = North Wollo zone 0.12 0.33 
Source: Own calculation based on EPIICA's survey; *1 Birr = 0.05 USD (on avg.) during the survey 
period. 
Borrowers who have an excess effective demand for credit but face a credit limit 
due to supply-side limitations were classified as ‘quantity constrained’ households. These 
households stated that they applied for formal credit and received a loan, but the loan 
amount was less than their effective demand given the available contract terms. Fourth, 
from the demand side, there are ‘transaction-cost rationed’ households who have positive 
effective demand but do not apply for credit. These households reported that they do not 
want to incur the additional costs associated with the loan application process, including 
the extra paperwork and the time they waste dealing with lenders. In addition, from their 
past experience or from their knowledge about lenders’ credit procedures, they are sure 
that their application will be rejected. Such households may have potentially profitable 
agricultural projects in mind, but they do not participate in the credit market because their 
projects become unprofitable once these costs are taken into account. Further, lenders 
normally want borrowers to bear a certain amount of risk to overcome the moral hazard 
problem in borrowers’ effort or choice of investment project. One mechanism to do so is 
to ask for collateral. However, risk-averse households are found to prefer working with 
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their own funds, not putting their land and other assets at risk. These farmers do not want 
to incur debt even if they qualify for the loan and have a profitable project after 
accounting for transaction costs.  
Table 4 shows categorization of credit constraint status of farm households and 
their willingness/ability to participate in the formal rural credit market in the study area. 
The percentage of unconstrained households who did not participate in the credit market 
has declined from about 43 percent in 2011 to 33 percent in 2013. However, the 
percentage of households who are quantity constrained has increased from 13 to 23 
percent. The percentage of discouraged households has increased from 22 percent in 
2011 to 27 percent in 2013. This clearly shows that, although farm households 
increasingly want to participate in the formal credit market, a growing number of these 
households are credit constrained. 
Table 4. Credit Constraint Status of HHs in the Study Area (Percent) 
Credit Constraint Category 2011 2013 Full sample 
Unconstrained Households 
      Borrowers 263(22.1) 205(17.2) 468(19.7) 
      Non-Borrowers 508(42.7) 389(32.7) 897(37.7) 
Total unconstrained households 771(64.8) 594(49.9) 1365(57.4) 
Constrained Households 
     Quantity Constrained borrowers 152(12.8) 269(22.6) 421(17.7) 
     Discouraged borrowers 266(22.4) 326(27.4) 592(25.0) 
Total constrained households 418(35.2) 595(50.1) 1013(42.7) 
 Source: Computed from EPIICA's 2011 and 2013 survey data. 
4.2.2. A Measure of Climatic Factors 
Climatic factors in this paper comprise temperature and rainfall average, rainfall 
variability and the incidence of drought. Monthly rainfall data were obtained from the 
National Meteorological Agency of Ethiopia, from eight stations close to the study 
districts (woredas) for the years between 1983 and 2013. The rainfall measure was 
constructed by taking the sum of monthly rainfall for each year and averaging it over 30 
years. The average temperature was also calculated as the monthly temperature average, 
further averaged over 30 years. Then, we calculated the coefficient of variation (CV) for 
rainfall, measured as the standard deviation divided by the mean for the respective 
periods. The major advantage of the CV is that it is scale-invariant and as such provides a 
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comparable measure of variation for households that may have very different wealth 
levels (Alem and Colmer 2013). As expected, the increasing variability of rainfall over 
the years in the study area concurs with the national pattern of rainfall variability.  Figure 
3 shows the coefficient of variation of rainfall across the study zones over time. We 
linked these climate variables with the household survey data using the thin plate spline 
regression technique. This method uses latitude, longitude, altitude and other relevant 
geographic information in linking climate data with survey data (Wahba 1990; Gu 2002; 
Wood 2003). We also included a dummy variable representing the households’ 
experience of drought shocks. 
Figure 3. Rainfall Variation by Year across the Study Zones 
Source: Own figure based on EPIICA's 2011 and 2013 survey. 
4.2.3. Ownership of Physical Assets and Social Capital 
Land holding is an important productive asset that determines the social and 
economic status of farmers in the study area. The survey data reveals that the mean land 
holding was about 1.07 hectares (ha) in 2011, which declined to about 0.73 in 2013. A 
major reason may be the fast population growth in the country in general, and the region 
in particular. Among the farming communities, farmers in West Gojjam owned relatively 
larger plots of land in 2011, followed by North Shewa and South Wollo. 
0
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The social capital variables included in the analysis are membership in a primary 
farmer’s cooperative association, participation in a kebele7 council, membership in a non-
cooperative peasant association and membership in a rotating saving and credit 
association (ROSCA) as explanatory variables. Membership in these groups is 
represented by a dummy variable with a value of 1 if respondents belong to these groups 
and 0 otherwise. These are important social assets enjoyed for their own sake, used for 
material gain, and called upon in times of shocks or crises (Woolcock and Narayan 
2000). On average, 10 percent of the total households interviewed indicated membership 
in a kebele association, while 23 percent indicated membership in a ROSCA (Table 3). 
4.2.4. Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Household socio-economic characteristics, such as age, gender, marital status, and 
level of education of the head, were included in the analysis as control variables. The 
average age of household heads in the sampled zones is about 50 years, with heads in 
West Gojjam zone being younger than those in the other three zones. The average 
household size was approximately five. About nine percent of the households in the study 
sites were headed by a female in 2011, with this figure having increased to twelve percent 
in 2013. Compared to the average of 51 percent, the proportion of those without any 
education in West Gojjam is the highest, at 63% in 2011 and 66% in 2013. On the other 
hand, 22 percent of the household heads have around 5 years of formal education, 
whereas 27 percent had attended some informal education as of 2011 and 24 percent as of 
2013. 
5. Estimation Procedure
The empirical strategy involves estimating the relationships between two key 
variables: credit constraints and adaptation strategy. However, the nature of the 
relationship between the two sets of variables as well as the characteristics of each set of 
variables calls for three major econometric considerations.  
First, analysing the impact of credit on different adaptation strategies by simple 
regression would lead to bias. This is because the decision to participate in the credit 
market by a household head is likely to be non-random if those who have access to credit 
have systematically different characteristics from the credit constrained. For example, 
households with more collateral resources, or those who possess better individual skills, 
7 A kebele is the lowest administrative unit in the Ethiopian governance structure. 
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ability and motivation, may have better access to credit, while those with fewer resources 
and weak networks are more likely to be credit constrained. Such factors may influence 
both access to credit and choice of adaptation strategies, resulting in inconsistent 
estimates of the effect of credit constraints on adaptation activity. In such instances, an 
appropriate model of analysis requires accounting for possible selection bias.  
Second, as discussed in Section 4.1, farmers adopt a mix of technologies to deal 
with a multitude of agricultural production constraints. This implies that the adoption 
decision is inherently multivariate, and attempting univariate modeling would exclude 
useful economic information about interdependent and simultaneous adoption decisions 
(Dorfman 1996). 
Hence, our econometric approach involves a two-stage estimation technique. In 
the first stage, the determinants of credit constraint are estimated using the generalized 
linear latent and mixed model (gllamm), whereby the predicted values of different credit 
constraint categories are obtained. In the second stage, the determinants of adaptation 
strategy are estimated using a multivariate probit (MVP) model with Inverse Mills Ratios 
(IMR), included as selectivity correction terms from the first stage. 
5.1. Determinants of Credit Constraints: The Generalized Linear Latent and 
Mixed (gllamm) Model  
A unique feature of longitudinal categorical data is the existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity among the repeated observations for a single individual (Haan and 
Uhlendorff 2006; Reyes and Lensink 2011). This heterogeneity may occur because each 
household can make several choices which may not be independent and hence the 
probabilities of each category for the same household will share the same unobservable 
random effects. The parameter estimates will be biased if these unobservables are not 
accounted for. This calls for a more advanced estimation strategy beyond the pooled 
multinomial model without the random effects. Hence, in the first stage of the analysis, 
we employed the generalized linear latent and mixed model (gllamm) to fit a multinomial 
logit model with correlated random intercepts, which accounts for any spurious 
dependence between different credit constraint categories. 
Consider an individual i who is faced with j different alternatives at time t. The 
probability that this individual falls in a specific category j conditional on observed 
characteristics itχ , which vary between individuals and over time, and also conditional
on unobserved individual effects, iα , which are time constant, can be specified as: 
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Here, we follow the standard assumption that α  is identically and independently
distributed over individuals and follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean µ
and variance- covariance matrix (Ω ), i.e., ( ),iidα µ Ω (Haan and Uhlendorff 2006; Train
2009). 
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This is so because the choice probabilities given in Equation (5.1) are conditioned 
on iα  and hence we must integrate over the distribution of α  to get the sample 
likelihood for the multinomial Logit with the random intercepts. This model will be 
identified if the coefficient vector ( )β  and the unobserved heterogeneity term ( )α  of one
category are set to zero. Hence, 1ijtd =  when individual i falls into category j at time t
and zero otherwise. 
The problem in solving Equation (5.2) is that we cannot obtain an analytical 
solution for the integral part of the model.  This calls for some form of numerical 
integration. The literature suggests various simulation and quadrature techniques 
including the Adaptive Gaussian Quadrature (AGQ), Monte Carlo Simulation, Laplace 
Approximation, Taylor series approximation, and Gauss Hermite quadrature to solve this 
problem (Hartzel et al. 2001; Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004). Among these simulation and 
quadrature techniques, the AGQ approach is preferred for longitudinal categorical data 
because it is computationally more efficient than the ordinary quadrature in performing 
the numerical integration of Equation (5.2). Another advantage of using the AGQ is that 
the number of quadrature points required to approximate the integral are much lower than 
that of the ordinary quadrature and prior studies have used this technique to evaluate 
similar integrals (examples include Hartzel et al. (2001); Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004); and 
Haynes et al. (2006)). 
STATA software has a procedure called the generalized linear, latent and mixed 
model (gllamm), which is designed to model categorical dependent variables with 
repeated observations (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004; Haan and Uhlendorff 2006). It is an 
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extension of the generalized linear model because it incorporates both the fixed and 
random effects and hence the response distribution is defined conditionally on the 
random effects. This model takes care of individual unobservable heterogeneity by 
accounting for the possible correlation of choices made by individuals. 
As the gllamm estimation is supposed to serve the purpose of correcting for 
selection bias, we include two variables as instruments. The first is the lag of credit 
access – a dummy variable capturing past information regarding whether the household 
has accessed any credit during the past year. The second is membership in a social group, 
again a dummy variable representing whether the household belongs in a social network. 
After regressing this model (Equation 5.2), we impute the Mills ratios and thereafter we 
include the Mills ratios as a regressor in our outcome model to correct for the selection 
bias. This approach has been employed by, among others, Millet (2001); Okten et al. 
(2004) and Bushway et al. (2007). The intuition behind this approach is that by including 
the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage model as a regressor in the second stage 
multivariate probit model, we obtain estimators that are free from the biasn caused by 
sample selection (Wooldridge 2002; Gujarati 2004; and Greene 2004). 
5.2. Choice of Adaptation Strategies: Multivariate Probit Model 
Our analytical approach for the second stage extends the model by Rahm and 
Huffman (1984) and Adesina and Zinnah (1993) that links farmers’ utility to the choice 
of a given agricultural technology (in our case, adaptation strategy) by adding credit 
constraints and environmental risk representing climate change. Accordingly, the 
adaptation equation is represented by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [5.3] 
For farmer i, at time t, 𝑃𝑃 is a dummy variable with 𝑃𝑃 = 1 if the adaptation 
strategy is adopted and 𝑃𝑃 = 0  otherwise. 𝛽𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated; 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables representing socio-economic, credit and climatic 
factors; 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the unobserved individual effect, which is assumed to be independent of 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖X; and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a random error term, 
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝐼𝐼. 𝐼𝐼.𝐷𝐷.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼2), and  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼2), 
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The likelihood function of the random effects (RE) probit model relies on the 
probabilities: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) = Φ(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) [5.4] 
where Φ(. ) is either the standard normal CDF (probit) or the logistic CDF (logit). 
The random effects model is associated with the strong assumption of no 
correlation between the unobserved individual effect 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and the regressors/observed 
covariates (Baltagi 2005). However, this is unlikely, because some of the time-invariant 
characteristics, such as farmer’s motivation or ability, may be correlated with some of the 
regressors in the model. The fixed effects estimator, on the other hand, relies on a 
transformation to remove this individual-specific constant term, along with time-invariant 
observed covariates (Wooldrige 2003). 
Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a method that allows for correlation between 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 
and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Our estimation procedure involves the pseudo-fixed effects estimation 
(Mundlak’s) approach (Wooldridge 2003), which involves explicitly modeling the 
relationship between time-varying regressors and the unobservable effect in an auxiliary 
regression (Mundlak 1978). In particular, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 can be approximated by a linear function: 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝜔𝜔?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     [5.5] 
where  𝑠𝑠�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents a vector of time-variant explanatory variables and ω  is a vector of
parameters to be estimated. Averaging over t for a given i and substituting the resulting 
expression into (5.4) gives:  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜔𝜔?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [5.6] 
where
*
itP is the choice of a given adaptation strategy by household i in year t. Moreover, if
we assume the error terms are independently and identically distributed across adaptation 
strategies, we estimate five separate adoption models for five different adaptation 
strategies. This assumes no interdependence among the strategies. However, a farmer 
may adopt two or more strategies simultaneously or the adoption of one strategy may be 
conditioned on the adoption of another strategy, because they are either substitutes or 
complements. 
Thus, a single equation estimation approach could cause bias and inefficiency in 
the parameters if the interdependence is observed and/or if unobserved heterogeneity is 
correlated among these strategies (Greene 2008). Following Teklewold et al. (2013) and 
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Kassie et al. (2013), we used a Multivariate Probit method (MVP8), which is a non-linear 
seemingly unrelated simultaneous equation model, and also a linear seemingly unrelated 
simultaneous equation model (SURE9), which allows correlation among the unobserved 
disturbances. This approach is found to be better suited to the adoption decisions for 
interrelated adaptation strategies. We also tested interdependence of technologies in the 
adoption decisions by checking the sign and significance of the off-diagonal elements of 
the variance-covariance matrix of the Multivariate Probit Model (MVP) and the SURE 
model. A positive sign is interpreted as a complementary relationship among the 
adaptation strategies, while a negative correlation is interpreted as substitutes. 
6. Discussion of Results
As discussed in Section 3, the adaptation strategies considered in the empirical 
analysis include soil conservation, participation in off-farm self-employment, crop 
diversification, irrigation, and depletion of household assets. Below, we discuss the 
quantitative relationship between these adaptation strategies and credit constraints, with 
climate-related variables as key conditioning factors. Before that, we present the 
determinants of credit constraint status, which is an endogenous determinant in the 
adaptation equations. 
6.1. Determinants of Credit Constraint Status 
Table 5 reports the determinants of the credit constraint category of households. 
The five important credit constraint categories that were considered in the analysis 
include unconstrained borrowers, unconstrained non-borrowers, and quantity constrained, 
discouraged, and risk rationed borrowers. The first category is used as a base case. 
Overall, factors such as age, gender, land holding, and experience of shock turned out to 
be the most important determinants of credit constraint in all the cases considered, amid 
variations in the sign, level of significance and magnitude of the coefficients. Variables 
explaining the credit constraint status of farm households are categorized into: (i) 
household demographic characteristics; (ii) ownership of livelihood assets; (iii) risk 
preference behavior; (iv) institutional constraints; and (v) location and exposure to 
climatic shocks. 
The results show that households living in South Wollo zone tend to be highly 
discouraged and quantity constrained, relative to households residing in the other three 
8 We would like to thank the referees for suggesting the MVP method, which greatly improved our 
estimation. 
9 We used the SURE model as a robustness test for the second definition of the crop diversification count 
variable since MVP works only for binary dependent variables. 
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zones of the study area. According to the World Bank (2005), 45 percent of the South 
Wollo zone is exposed to drought and malaria. This seems logical, in that access to 
external sources of finance is very difficult in such a fragile environment, because lenders 
are not willing to take uninsured risks of default in the case of crop failure due to climatic 
shocks. Households residing in West Gojjam zone, however, are found to have relatively 
better access to formal credit. This may be because West Gojjam is a relatively more 
fertile region of the country. 
Table (5) also presents institutional constraints in the credit market of the study 
area, including high transaction costs of borrowing associated with the loan application 
process, paperwork, and distance, as well as institutional mistakes made in selecting 
applicants. As expected, the results also depict a significant positive effect of these 
constraints on the probability of being credit constrained. Such high transaction costs of 
borrowing discourage genuine applicants who want to have access to rural finance. 
We used the year dummy as a control variable to capture the change in credit 
constraints and borrowing behavior of farm households between 2011 and 2013. The 
result shows that the probability of being quantity constrained increased by about 61 
percent, which implies that farm households do not get the amount of credit for which 
they apply. 
Among the socio-economic variables, age of the household head is found to have 
a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of being discouraged. The 
result shows that gender has a negative and significant effect on the probability of being 
credit constrained. This implies that female-headed households have higher probability of 
access to rural credit, compared to their male counterparts in the context of the study 
area. This may be due to the recent micro-credit revolution, which focuses more on 
empowering women. It agrees with the actual case in rural Ethiopia, where 54 percent of 
the clients of micro-finance institutions are female (EEA 2011). Ashraf et al. (2003) 
showed that credit schemes which favor female-headed households have gained 
popularity in recent years and have become successful. Aterido et al. (2011) reached a 
similar conclusion. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Credit Constraint Categories—Result from gllamm 
Variable 
Unconstrained non-
borrowers 
Constrained - Quantity 
rationed borrowers 
Discouraged - Tran. 
cost constrained 
borrowers 
Discouraged - 
risk-rationed 
borrowers 
Age .0231*** 0.0127* 0.0276*** 0.016** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Female -1.4*** -0.553 -1.08** 
-
1.439*** 
(0.454) (0.44) (0.461) (0.535) 
Married -.745* -0.424 -0.735* -1.066** 
(0.422) (0.423) (0.431) (0.485) 
Household size -0.077 -0.0245 0.055 0.01 
(0.05) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) 
No educ. .459** -0.2 .497** 0.413 
(0.228) (0.213) (0.237) (0.283) 
Formal educ. -0.106 0.107 0.178 0.354 
(0.239) (0.223) (0.247) (0.299) 
Land hect. .466*** 0.001 0.134 0.216 
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 (0.12) (0.123) (0.125)  (0.171)  
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) -1.28** -0.795 -1.11*  -0.471  
 (0.568) (0.574) (0.579)  (0.676)  
Coop member 0.0732 0.137 -0.11  -0.543  
 (0.302) (0.308) (0.307)  (0.338)  
Year dummy -0.148 .613*** 0.159  0.188  
 (0.183) (0.189) (0.19)  (0.327)  
Ln(food exp) 0.191 0.035 .274**  0.236*  
 (0.121) (0.119) (0.126)  (0.142)  
Drought shock 0.18 .459** 0.279  0.206  
 (0.187) (0.181) (0.192)  (0.285)  
West Gojjam -1.65*** -0.136 -1.32***  
-
0.726***  
 (0.228) (0.209) (0.229)  (0.269)  
South Wollo 1.56*** 1.63*** 1.38***  1.085***  
  (0.279) (0.288) (0.284)   (0.312)  
North Wollo -.493* .93*** -.909***  
-
1.291***  
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Note:  * p < .1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in bracket. UCNB, QCB, and DISC stand for unconstrained non-borrower, quantity 
constrained borrower, and discouraged borrower. 
 (0.297) (0.271) (0.314)  (0.406)  
HH faced credit constraint last year 
-
0.989*** -0.352 0.158  1.688***  
   (0.244) (0.284) (0.494)  (0.412)  
head is member in a solidarity group 
-
2.684*** 
-
1.365*** -1.880***  
-
2.957***  
   (0.212) (0.214) (0.431)  (0.278)  
Constant 0.944 -0.22 -0.283  -1.269  
         (0.95) (0.947) (0.982)  (1.167)  
Statistics         
Log likelihood  -2794.11      
Obs. 2294      
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As discussed in Section 5.1, we included two variables as instruments: (1) the lag 
of credit access, a dummy variable capturing past information regarding whether the 
household has accessed any credit during the past year; and (2) membership in a 
solidarity group, again a dummy variable representing whether the household belongs to 
a social network. The result shows that having faced credit constraint in the previous 
period significantly discourages participation in the credit market. Household heads who 
are members of a social group, however, are found to be less constrained and more likely 
to participate in the rural credit market. We tested the joint significance of these variables 
and imputed the Mills ratios to be included as regressors in our outcome model to correct 
for the selection bias. This is also a common approach in the literature; see, for example, 
Okten et al. (2004), Bushway et al. (2007) and Teklewold et al. (2013). 
6.2. Credit Constraints and Participation in Off-Farm Income Generating 
Activities 
Table 6 presents determinants of the probability of participating in off-farm 
income generating activities for different credit constraint categories. The coefficients 
show negative impacts on off-farm employment as a result of being in the discouraged 
and risk rationed borrower categories. These results demonstrate that credit constraints 
adversely affect the probability of participation in off-farm employment. These results are 
also in line with our review of the literature in Section 2, which indicated that at least 
some of the activities require start-up capital and institutional support. This finding is in 
line with empirical studies in Honduras (Ruben and van den Berg 2001) Columbia 
(Deininger and Olinto 2001) and Peru (Escobals 2001).   
The coefficient of variation (CV) of rainfall is found to have no significant effect 
on the choice to participate in off-farm income generating activities.10 Similarly, the 
incidence of drought shock is not a significant determinant of participation in off-farm 
employment activities. 
The interaction between credit constraint and coefficient of variation of rainfall is 
significant for the risk rationed group. This suggests that, when coupled with credit 
constraints, the adverse effects of climate variability are intensified. Further, the 
                                                 
10 As a robustness check, we used mean rainfall and mean temperature in place of coefficient of variation 
of rainfall. Mean rainfall  is a signficant and positive determinant of adaptation in all the categories, while 
the effect of temperature is not significant; see Table (5A-9A) . 
Environment for Development Bezabih, Elias, and Ferede 
27 
incidence of drought was interacted with the credit constraint variable; however, the 
coefficients are not significant.  
Table 6. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Off-Farm  
Self-Employment: A Multivariate Probit Model with Rainfall CV, Mean Temperature, 
and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Participation in Off_farm employment (IGA) 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) 0.105 0.149 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 0.236* 0.175 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) 0.040 0.214 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) -0.128 0.145 
Climate variables    
Rainfall CV -0.098 0.235 
Mean Temperature -0.015 0.174 
Mean Temperature sqr 0.001 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) 0.155 0.134 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV -0.765** 0.341 
risk_rashned * rain_CV -0.629** 0.319 
Discouraged * rain_CV -0.385 0.605 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
Land owned (hectare) -0.243* 0.158 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 0.033 0.173 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.128 0.199 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head -0.011*** 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household 0.363* 0.280 
Dummy for a married head -0.086 0.260 
Household size -0.136 0.144 
Head has no education -0.175 0.243 
Head attended some formal education -0.318 0.322 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) 0.110 0.192 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.234 0.304 
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Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) 0.774** 0.370 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) 0.021 0.263 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) -0.032 0.174 
Household size (time_avg) 0.184 0.145 
year  dummy 0.089 0.252 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -0.337* 0.214 
Dummy for South Wollo -0.207 0.218 
Dummy for North Wollo -0.315 0.255 
Constant -0.437 2.208 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 525.48   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.239   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
Our results also hold when other controls, such as physical and social capital 
variables, household socio-economic characteristics and location dummies are included 
in the model.  
The results show that female heads are more likely to participate in off-farm 
employment. This may be because females have better access to credit in the context of 
the study area, as discussed in Section 6.1. Having some formal education also appears to 
have a positive impact on off-farm employment participation, as evidenced by its 
significant coefficient. 
6.3. Credit Constraints and Crop Diversification 
Table 7 presents the effect of credit constraints and climatic factors on crop 
diversification. We captured the level of diversification using a dummy variable coded as 
one for households who plant a greater number of crops on their plots (for example, cash 
crops such as vegetables, pulses, oil seeds, etc.) and zero for those who plant a smaller 
number of crops (for example, traditional staples such as cereals only). From the results, 
we note that quantity constrained households tend to diversify more, while discouraged 
borrowers diversify significantly less. This could be explained by the fact that planting 
cash crops is risky and requires substantial cash outlays to purchase inputs such as seeds 
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and fertilizers. Prior studies also confirm that access to credit is one of the critical factors 
in the crop diversification decisions of farm households (see Section 2).  
Table 7. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Crop Diversification 
Decision: A Multivariate Probit Model with Rainfall CV,  
Mean Temperature, and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: crop diversification 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) -0.782 0.567 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 3.211 2.410 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) -7.434** 2.956 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) 0.373 0.792 
Climate variables    
Rainfall CV 0.732*** 0.255 
Mean Temperature 0.320** 0.146 
Mean Temperature sqr -0.006** 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.340** 0.160 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV 0.323 0.308 
risk_rashned * rain_CV -0.053 0.180 
Discouraged * rain_CV -0.125 0.121 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) 0.263 0.232 
plot has gentle slope 0.317 0.243 
distance_to_plot 0.001 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) -0.115 0.142 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 0.178 0.147 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.008 0.175 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head 0.011** 0.005 
dummy for female head of the household 0.659** 0.281 
Dummy for a married head -0.149 0.230 
Household size 0.029 0.119 
Head has no education -0.417** 0.218 
Head attended some formal education 0.083 0.283 
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Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) -0.353** 0.175 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.423** 0.250 
Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) 0.066 0.325 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) -0.109 0.230 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) -0.181 0.148 
Household size (time_avg) -0.020 0.122 
year  dummy 0.515** 0.221 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -1.001*** 0.194 
Dummy for South Wollo 0.113 0.310 
Dummy for North Wollo 0.034 0.296 
Constant -2.175 3.495 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 525.48   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.239   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The impact of climatic factors, measured by the coefficient of variation of rainfall, 
shows that the coefficient of variation of rainfall is not a significant determinant of crop 
diversification. In order to assess the impact of credit constraints conditional on rainfall 
variability, we interact these two sets of variables. We find that the interaction between 
rainfall variability and credit constraint has no significant impact on diversification. 
Similarly, the results from the interaction between credit constraint dummies and the 
incidence of drought show no significant impact. This could be because climatic 
variability is not sufficient for the effect to manifest in the diversification decision. The 
benefit of diversification, in terms of acting as a shock-absorber against environmental 
variability, is conditional on the severity of the variability; in other words, the level of 
environmental variability needs to be sufficiently high (Bezabih and Gaeback 2010; Di 
Falco et al. 2010) or risk-prone areas with high rainfall variability need to be targeted (Di 
Falco and Chavas 2009). 
Of the socio-economic characteristics, farmers who have no education and have 
larger land holdings tend to diversify less. Other variables, such as household size, 
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marital status, and plot characteristics, are found to have no significant impact on the 
decision to diversify. 
As a robustness check, we also defined crop diversification as count diversity. 
The count diversity is constructed as the number of crops grown on a farm in any given 
year (see Benin et al. 2014). So, if we have teff, maize, wheat, and barley grown in year 
2011 in household 1, then the count diversity of household 1 will be 4. For this definition, 
we used the seemingly unrelated regression (XTSUR) model to estimate the effect of 
credit constraints and climatic factors on crop diversification. The result is given in Table 
7A in the appendix. From the results, we note that facing drought shock forces farmers to 
plant a greater number of crops as a risk diversification strategy, while risk rationing in 
the credit market compels them to plant a significantly lower number of crops. This 
agrees with our result in Table 7. 
6.4. Credit Constraints, Tree Planting and Soil Conservation 
As per the results in Table 8, we found that credit constraints have no significant 
effect on land conservation activities. Similarly, neither the coefficient of variation of 
rainfall nor the incidence of drought are significant determinants of soil conservation and 
tree planting activities. The interaction between the coefficient of variation of rainfall and 
credit constraints is also not significant, indicating that soil conservation practices may 
not be responsive to credit availability/constraints. One plausible explanation for this 
insignificant coefficient is that soil conservation and afforestation measures are highly 
subsidized by the government. Mekonnen and Damte (2011) found similar results, where 
credit constraints had no significant effect on the likelihood of investing in soil 
conservation and tree planting in Ethiopia.  
The exception, the reduction in the propensity to invest in soil conservation for 
the discouraged category of borrowers, is negative and significant when interacted with 
drought shock. This indicates some evidence of the potency of credit constraints in 
hampering conservation activities in the incidence of drought shock. This is in line with 
findings by Di Falco and Veronsi (2014) and Teklewold et al. (2015), who find a 
significant role of soil conservation in acting as an adaptation mechanism.  
Older heads of household, household size, and education are positively and 
significantly associated with soil conservation activities.  
  
Environment for Development Bezabih, Elias, and Ferede 
32 
Table 8. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Soil Conservation 
and Planting Trees: A Multivariate Probit Model with Rainfall CV, Mean 
Temperature, and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Soil Conservation and Planting Trees 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) -0.392 0.472 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) -0.826 2.000 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) -6.102** 2.737 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) -0.379 0.691 
Climate variables    
Rainfall CV 0.144 0.187 
Mean Temperature 0.252** 0.131 
Mean Temperature sqr -0.006** 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.061 0.140 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV -0.255 0.280 
risk_rashned * rain_CV -0.072 0.157 
Discouraged * rain_CV -0.040 0.129 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) 0.323* 0.190 
plot has gentle slope 0.493*** 0.202 
distance_to_plot 0.003** 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) 0.105 0.116 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) -0.061 0.130 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.139 0.154 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head 0.007* 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household 0.152 0.249 
Dummy for a married head -0.087 0.206 
Household size 0.293*** 0.106 
Head has no education -0.109 0.188 
Head attended some formal education 0.309 0.251 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) -0.002 0.141 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.346* 0.216 
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Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) -0.164 0.286 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) -0.403** 0.203 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) 0.057 0.130 
Household size (time_avg) -0.247** 0.108 
year  dummy 0.383** 0.203 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam 0.223* 0.168 
Dummy for South Wollo -0.793*** 0.183 
Dummy for North Wollo -0.150 0.254 
Constant 1.830 2.990 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 525.48   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.239   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
6.5. Credit Constraints and Household Assets Depletion 
The results in Table 9 show that being in the risk rationed borrower’s category 
significantly increases the likelihood of asset depletion. This probability significantly 
increases when rainfall variability is interacted with risk rationing. This implies that 
adverse effects of climate variability are more severe for risk rationed households, who 
are shown to resort to asset depletion. However, the interaction between the credit 
constraint variable and drought gives insignificant results. The result further shows that 
farmers who are members of a ROSCA are less likely to engage in asset depletion, while 
other social capital variables are found to have no effect on the asset depletion decision. 
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Table 9. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Depleting Productive 
Assets: A Multivariate Probit Model with Rainfall CV,  
Mean Temperature and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Depleting Productive Assets 
VARIABLES Coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) 1.742*** 0.497 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 2.211 1.864 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) 1.979 2.403 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) 0.904 0.714 
Climate variables    
Rainfall CV 0.629*** 0.191 
Mean Temperature -0.164 0.139 
Mean Temperature sqr 0.004* 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.081 0.112 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV 0.580** 0.278 
risk_rashned * rain_CV 0.532*** 0.161 
Discouraged * rain_CV 0.859** 0.474 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) 0.048 0.185 
plot has gentle slope -0.218 0.199 
distance_to_plot -0.003* 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) 0.235** 0.116 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 0.260** 0.134 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.094 0.158 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head 0.002 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household 0.106 0.260 
Dummy for a married head 0.316 0.217 
Household size -0.139 0.107 
Head has no education 0.188 0.190 
Head attended some formal education 0.344 0.257 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) 0.080 0.143 
Head has no education (time_avg) -0.247 0.221 
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Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) -0.171 0.291 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) -0.214 0.207 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) -0.266** 0.134 
Household size (time_avg) 0.174* 0.109 
year  dummy -0.186 0.220 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -0.309* 0.175 
Dummy for South Wollo -0.287 0.187 
Dummy for North Wollo 0.390* 0.250 
Constant -4.593* 2.758 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 525.48   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.239   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
6.6. Credit Constraints and Investment in Small-Scale Irrigation 
The results in Table 10 indicate that facing drought shock is the main driver of 
investment in small-scale irrigation in the study sites. This behavior has been increasing 
over the years spanning our analysis, as the positive and significant year dummy 
confirms. One reason for this improvement may be the priority given by the government 
to small-scale irrigation projects in recent years, in order to increase agricultural 
productivity and tackle the adverse effects of climate change to promote green growth 
(MoFED 2014). The socio-economic control variables, except for age, are found to be 
non-significant.  
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Table 10. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Investing in Small-
scale Irrigation: A Multivariate Probit Model with Rainfall CV, Mean Temperature, 
and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Investing in Small-scale Irrigation 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) 0.269* 0.157 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 0.412 0.512 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) 0.696*** 0.240 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) 0.074 0.159 
Climate variables    
Rainfall CV 0.430 0.296 
Mean Temperature 0.110 0.155 
Mean Temperature sqr -0.002 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.300 0.246 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV -0.118 1.129 
risk_rashned * rain_CV 0.025 0.292 
Discouraged * rain_CV -4.311 116.998 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) 0.630** 0.285 
plot has gentle slope 0.332 0.299 
distance_to_plot -0.001 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) -0.096 0.133 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) -0.356** 0.166 
Own radio (proxy for info.) -0.103 0.188 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head -0.006* 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household -0.301 0.267 
Dummy for a married head -0.289 0.235 
Household size 0.127 0.112 
Head has no education 0.095 0.218 
Head attended some formal education 0.532* 0.315 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) 0.142 0.171 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.171 0.267 
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Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) -0.365 0.357 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) 0.255 0.244 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) 0.352** 0.167 
Household size (time_avg) -0.146 0.115 
year  dummy -0.003 0.218 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -0.839*** 0.241 
Dummy for South Wollo 0.922*** 0.256 
Dummy for North Wollo 0.867*** 0.277 
Constant -3.260 2.176 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 525.48   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.239   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
Table 11. Estimated Covariance Matrix of the Multivariate Probit Model (MVP) 
Regression between Different Adaptation Strategies 
 Cρ  Eρ  Tρ  Dρ  Iρ  
Cρ  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eρ  
0.34 
(0.068)*** 1 
   
Tρ  
0.27 
(0.053)*** 0.099(0.066)* 1 
  
Dρ  
-0.066 
(0.059) 
-
0.18(0.069)*** 0.028(0.052) 1 
 
Iρ  
0.035 
(0.068) -0.002(0.080) 0.047(0.065) 0.015(0.065) 
1 
Likelihood ratio test of: rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho51 = rho32 = rho42 = rho52 = rho43 = rho53 = rho54 = 0 
)10(2χ = 58.95    
Prob> 2χ = 0.00 
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7. Conclusions 
This study empirically investigated the links between alternative adaptation 
strategies and different forms of credit constraints in selected areas of the Amhara 
Regional State of Ethiopia using household-level panel data. Key determinants of the 
choice of adaptation strategies include constraint status (being a risk rationed, 
discouraged, or unconstrained borrower); exposure to climatic factors; household 
demographic characteristics; ownership of livelihood assets; and other control variables 
such as location. The quantitative analysis points to the fact that the type of credit 
constraint matters for the choice of adaptation strategies of households.  
The findings of the study can be summarized in four major ways. First, the 
existence of a significant proportion of discouraged and risk rationed borrowers indicates 
that the rural credit market in Ethiopia is not yet inclusive; we found that this reduces the 
adaptive capacity of farm households. For instance, discouraging credit policies and 
procedures reduces the probability of participation in off-farm employment. This can be 
explained by the fact that lenders usually make their credit procedures very stringent to 
solve the screening, monitoring, and moral hazard problems that are very common in the 
credit market of developing countries (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Antwi and Antwi 2010). 
Further, the adaptive capacity of risk rationed farmers has significantly decreased. This 
can be explained by the fact that lenders require borrowers to bear some amount of risk in 
the form of collateral. Second, relatively better credit access seems to have encouraged 
irrigation, while credit constraint seems to have discouraged participation in off-farm 
employment and diversification. This largely significant impact of the different credit 
constraint categories on participation in alternative adaptation strategies confirms the 
critical role credit availability has in adaptation investment. Similarly, the importance of 
the interaction terms between rainfall variability and credit constraint categories in the 
choice of adaptation strategies indicates the importance of credit, especially with greater 
effect of climatic factors. As shown in Table 11, there is a strong interdependence in the 
choice of adaptation strategies by a given household. 
The role of credit in the uptake of the different adaptation strategies underlines the 
need to understand the links between credit institutions and the other institutions directly 
linked with the different adaptation strategies, such as seed delivery mechanisms (in 
relation to diversification), land tenure arrangements (in relation to tree planting and soil 
conservation), and general agricultural extension systems (in relation to irrigation 
activities). Further, given the links between credit constraints and climatic factors noted 
in this study, increasing awareness about how the credit market works and provision of 
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climate information can help farmers better adapt to climate change. Administrative 
zones such as South and North Wollo, which are more vulnerable to climate variability, 
need special assistance so that they may have better access to the rural credit market and 
build their adaptive capacity. 
Responsiveness of adaptation strategies may differ depending on whether credit is 
accessed from the informal or formal sector. It should be noted that the analysis does not 
go into the potentially differing impacts of formal and informal credit access and their 
possible interactions. Given the lack of detailed information on the nature of credit access 
from the informal sector, as opposed to the kind of information we were able to extract 
on formal sector credit access, it was not possible to look in depth into credit access by 
degree of formality. For the future, a more detailed analysis of credit access by the nature 
of formality is required.  
While the paper makes an important stride in jointly analysing the role of credit 
constraints in different climate adaptation strategies, there are two key shortcomings of 
the paper. First, our analysis of the responsiveness of adaptation strategies to climatic 
factors uses measures such as the 30 year mean of temperature and rainfall as well as the 
30 year coefficient of variation of rainfall. This does not encompass the climate change 
responses of these adaptation strategies, as the analysis does not incorporate actual 
climate change measures. Furthermore, the analysis does not assess the welfare impacts 
of the adaptation strategies, focusing only on the responsiveness of the strategies to credit 
constraints. Both these gaps are subjects worthy of further investigation. 
The policy implications of this paper also go beyond the role of credit in 
adaptation to climate change. Policies that enhance and strengthen institutional support 
may also be valuable in enhancing the adaptation capacity of households. Hence, in 
future research, it is worth investigating the role of similar institutions in the context of 
climate change adaptation. 
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Appendix. Additional Regression Results for Robustness Test 
Table A1. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Off-Farm Self-
Employment: A Multivariate Probit Model with Mean Rainfall, Mean Temperature, 
and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Off_farm self-employment 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) 0.130 0.149 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 0.266* 0.176 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) 0.073 0.213 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) -0.101 0.146 
Climate variables    
Mean Rainfall -0.053*** 0.014 
Mean Temperature 0.261* 0.176 
Mean Temperature sqr -0.006* 0.004 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) 0.114 0.133 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV -0.882** 0.345 
risk_rashned * rain_CV -0.759** 0.326 
Discouraged * rain_CV -0.414 0.607 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
Land owned (hectare) -0.237* 0.159 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 0.041 0.175 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.164 0.202 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head -0.011*** 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household 0.323 0.284 
Dummy for a married head -0.100 0.263 
Household size -0.150 0.145 
Head has no education -0.227 0.244 
Head attended some formal education -0.410 0.327 
Time Average (Mundlak) 
 
   
Land owned (time_avg) 0.109 0.194 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.320 0.306 
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Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) 0.898** 0.376 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) -0.045 0.267 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) -0.041 0.176 
Household size (time_avg) 0.197 0.147 
year  dummy 0.449* 0.269 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam 1.895*** 0.644 
Dummy for South Wollo -0.0285 0.181 
Dummy for North Wollo -0.403** 0.208 
Constant 1.611 1.953 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 522.1   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.18   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.   
Table A2. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Crop Diversification 
Decision: A Multivariate Probit Model with Mean Rainfall, Mean Temperature, and 
Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: crop diversification 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) -0.509 0.557 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 4.214* 2.394 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) -7.670** 2.932 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) 0.153 0.790 
Climate variables    
Mean Rainfall -0.005 0.013 
Mean Temperature 0.165 0.140 
Mean Temperature sqr -0.003 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.250* 0.157 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV 0.314 0.308 
risk_rashned * rain_CV -0.032 0.180 
Discouraged * rain_CV -0.333*** 0.103 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
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plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) 0.319 0.230 
plot has gentle slope 0.367* 0.240 
distance_to_plot 0.001 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) -0.061 0.141 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 0.163 0.147 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.029 0.175 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head 0.014*** 0.005 
dummy for female head of the household 0.534** 0.278 
Dummy for a married head -0.256 0.226 
Household size 0.015 0.120 
Head has no education -0.340* 0.217 
Head attended some formal education 0.122 0.283 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) -0.374** 0.175 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.361 0.248 
Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) 0.039 0.324 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) -0.147 0.230 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) -0.167 0.148 
Household size (time_avg) -0.007 0.122 
year  dummy    
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -0.660 0.592 
Dummy for South Wollo 0.187 0.305 
Dummy for North Wollo -0.284 0.273 
Constant 0.354 3.440 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 522.1   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.177   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table A3. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Soil Conservation 
and Planting Trees: A Multivariate Probit Model with  
Mean Rainfall, Mean Temperature, and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Soil Conservation and Planting Trees 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories    
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) -0.447 0.468 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) -1.152 2.004 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) -6.033** 2.741 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) -0.494 0.692 
Climate variables    
Mean Rainfall 0.017* 0.012 
Mean Temperature 0.210* 0.128 
Mean Temperature sqr -0.004* 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.068 0.139 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV -0.262 0.280 
risk_rashned * rain_CV -0.081 0.156 
Discouraged * rain_CV -0.038 0.128 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) 0.323* 0.188 
plot has gentle slope 0.483** 0.200 
distance_to_plot 0.003** 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) 0.110 0.116 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) -0.060 0.129 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.128 0.154 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head 0.006* 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household 0.148 0.250 
Dummy for a married head -0.083 0.207 
Household size 0.293*** 0.106 
Head has no education -0.092 0.189 
Head attended some formal education 0.324 0.251 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) -0.001 0.141 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.333* 0.216 
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Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) -0.181 0.286 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) -0.386* 0.203 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) 0.056 0.130 
Household size (time_avg) -0.247** 0.108 
year  dummy 0.280* 0.215 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -0.577 0.522 
Dummy for South Wollo -0.788*** 0.150 
Dummy for North Wollo -0.068 0.229 
Constant 0.862 2.861 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 522.1   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.177   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
  
Table A4. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Depleting 
Productive Assets: A Multivariate Probit Model with  
Mean Rainfall, Mean Temperature, and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Depleting Productive Assets 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories     
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) 1.556*** 0.490 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 1.898 1.871 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) 2.189 2.407 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) 1.034 0.716 
Climate variables    
Mean Rainfall 0.027** 0.014 
Mean Temperature -0.071 0.140 
Mean Temperature sqr 0.003 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.127 0.110 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV 0.565** 0.277 
risk_rashned * rain_CV 0.467*** 0.159 
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Discouraged * rain_CV 0.871* 0.475 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) -0.004 0.183 
plot has gentle slope -0.272 0.197 
distance_to_plot -0.002* 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) 0.233** 0.116 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 0.276** 0.133 
Own radio (proxy for info.) 0.082 0.158 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head 0.002 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household 0.078 0.259 
Dummy for a married head 0.317 0.217 
Household size -0.143 0.107 
Head has no education 0.180 0.190 
Head attended some formal education 0.333 0.257 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) 0.087 0.143 
Head has no education (time_avg) -0.223 0.221 
Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) -0.166 0.291 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) -0.190 0.207 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) -0.281** 0.134 
Household size (time_avg) 0.180* 0.109 
year  dummy    
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -1.735*** 0.619 
Dummy for South Wollo -0.015 0.155 
Dummy for North Wollo 0.779*** 0.219 
Constant -8.501*** 2.614 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 522.1   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.177   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table A5. Effect of Credit Constraints and Climatic Factors on Investing in Small-
Scale Irrigation: A Multivariate Probit Model with Mean Rainfall, Mean 
Temperature, and Mundlak Effects 
Dependent variable: Investing in Small-scale Irrigation 
VARIABLES coefficient std.err. 
Credit constraint categories     
Unconst.non Borrower (IMR) 0.313** 0.156 
Quantity constrained Borrower (IMR) 0.574 0.504 
Discouraged Borrower (IMR) 0.701*** 0.239 
Risk rationed Borrower (IMR) 0.069 0.158 
Climate variables    
Mean Rainfall -0.016 0.014 
Mean Temperature 0.052 0.141 
Mean Temperature sqr -0.001 0.003 
Household faced drought shock (self-reported) -0.302 0.246 
Interaction terms    
Qnty_const * rain_CV -0.447 1.109 
risk_rashned * rain_CV 0.123 0.281 
Discouraged * rain_CV -4.581 283.391 
Physical asset and plot characteristics    
plot has flat slope (base cat. =  steepy slope) 0.663*** 0.284 
plot has gentle slope 0.368 0.298 
distance_to_plot -0.001 0.002 
Land owned (hectare) -0.093 0.133 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) -0.357** 0.166 
Own radio (proxy for info.) -0.083 0.189 
Household Characteristics    
Age of head -0.006* 0.004 
dummy for female head of the household -0.306 0.267 
Dummy for a married head -0.282 0.234 
Household size 0.120 0.112 
Head has no education 0.103 0.217 
Head attended some formal education 0.526* 0.315 
Time Average (Mundlak)    
Land owned (time_avg) 0.143 0.171 
Head has no education (time_avg) 0.161 0.267 
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Head attended some formal educ. (time_avg) -0.360 0.357 
Own radio (proxy for info.) (time_avg) 0.227 0.245 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)  (time_avg) 0.352** 0.167 
Household size (time_avg) -0.139 0.115 
year  dummy -0.070 0.226 
Location factors    
Dummy for West Gojjam -0.065 0.634 
Dummy for South Wollo 0.724*** 0.175 
Dummy for North Wollo 0.601*** 0.193 
Constant -0.459 1.686 
Statistics    
Observations 1140   
Wald chi-square 522.1   
Prob > chi2     = 0   
Log likelihood =  -2632.177   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
